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Executive Summary 
 Although Medicaid work requirements are currently halted in both Arkansas and 
Kentucky, this analysis utilizes the data available to make an assessment and estimate of what 
Kentucky’s Medicaid enrollment will look like if work requirements similar to those Arkansas 
had are ever implemented. The relative severity of the administrative burden of such 
requirements provide a tool for comparison, and a difference-in-differences analysis of the 
change in Medicaid enrollment between Arkansas and West Virginia, a state that has not 
implemented and currently has no plans to implement Medicaid work requirements, provide the 
bases for this estimate. After coding the work requirements of Kentucky and Arkansas, and 
ranking each on a 1-5 scoring scale, 1 being least severe and 5 being the most, I use total 
enrollment data for Arkansas, Kentucky, and West Virginia, and I estimate the difference-in-
differences of the percent of those enrolled divided by the state’s annual population between 
West Virginia, my control state, and Arkansas, my treatment state. After standardizing and then 
comparing Arkansas to West Virginia through difference-in-difference testing, I find a net drop 
in enrollment with substantial uncertainty associated with it, leading to the conclusion in the first 
step of this analysis showing that while Arkansas has more of a decrease post-treatment in 
Medicaid enrollment than West Virginia, much of it is likely due to other factors.  
These states’ trends are similar enough to provide an effective comparison for Kentucky, 
however.  I found that if Kentucky ever implements work requirements, the change due to work 
requirements alone will be a decrease in enrollment by 24,129 people, over and above the 
existing trend. The estimation of Kentucky with work requirements is based on the difference-in-
differences estimation between Arkansas and West Virginia subtracted from Medicaid 
enrollment annual population in Kentucky from June 2018 to December of 2018. This analysis 
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provides an estimation of what could happen to total Medicaid enrollment in Kentucky, and 
possibly other states, if work and community engagement requirements are implemented. Future 
studies will hopefully have more data available in order to construct a more valid study of the 
actual effect of work requirements in states that have implemented them in comparison with 
those that have not and do not plan to – in order to inform the states that plan to what will happen 
to their Medicaid enrollment. Future studies that ask this same or a similar research question 
should also take into account other factors affecting Medicaid enrollment to provide a better 
basis for their estimation in order to predict their effect on the state(s) in question. 
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Introduction 
 The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA), colloquially known as 
Obamacare or the ACA, signed into law by President Obama in 2010, mandated that states could 
use federal funds to expand their Medicaid programs to include “adults up to 138 percent of the 
poverty level” (MACPAC, 2019). While this mandate was originally a requirement under the 
law, in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, the Supreme Court found this 
requirement unconstitutional in that Congress could not use its spending power in this way, 
making Medicaid expansion optional (MACPAC, 2019). Since this decision in June of 2012, 
states have followed different paths to coverage expansion, taking advantage of provisions in 
Section 1115 of the Social Security Act that allow for research and demonstration waivers. As of 
March 15, 2019, eight states applying for Medicaid expansion were granted approval for their 
Section 1115 waivers, and they include work requirements for beneficiaries. Further, six of the 
waivers out of the total of eighteen (across seventeen states) that were pending as of April 6, 
2019 (and waiting to receive approval or rejection with comments from the Centers for Medicare 
& Medicaid Services (CMS)) were waivers with work requirements (Kaiser Family Foundation, 
2019). Two of these states, Arkansas and Kentucky, were granted federal authority from CMS to 
implement “work and community engagement requirements” (MACPAC, 2018b). CMS also 
“issued subregulatory guidance” for states that decide to implement similar requirements in the 
future (MACPAC, 2018b). 
A federal district court blocked Kentucky’s waiver for work requirements in June of 2018 
stating that “at minimum, the Secretary [of the Department of Health and Human Services 
(HHS)] failed to ‘adequately analyze’ coverage” when approving Kentucky’s waiver. According 
to presiding Judge Boasberg, this failure to analyze impacts of work requirements left questions 
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concerning the potential loss of coverage among current Medicaid recipients and the promotion 
of Medicaid as a source of coverage for potential beneficiaries (Galewitz, 2018). After this court 
ruling, the waiver was edited and resubmitted, gaining approval from the Trump Administration, 
but not officially implemented (Yetter, 2019). Instead, Kentucky faced a court challenge. On 
March 27, 2019, the Federal District Court for the District of Columbia blocked both Kentucky’s 
and Arkansas’s work requirements in Charles Gresham et al., v. Alex M. Azar II, et al. (2019). In 
his decision, the judge cited parts of 5 U.S.C. § 706(2), the Administrative Procedure Act, and 
case precedent from FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc, 556 U.S. 502, 513 (2009). On April 10, 
2019, the Trump Administration appealed this decision to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia Circuit (Cheves, 2019). This new development will be expanded upon 
further, with the analysis in this paper exploring the possibility that this court ruling will be 
overturned, or that the waivers will eventually be approved after states make enough changes to 
their plans to satisfy a court (Goodnough, 2019). 
While Medicaid work requirements are considered a fairly new policy option, they have 
been a central piece of the Trump Administration’s health care policy platform since the 
inauguration. Kentucky and Arkansas, for example, both define work requirements as the 
following. If an individual who is eligible for Medicaid meets certain criteria and is not exempt 
from the program for certain allowable reasons, the individual must complete and report to their 
state’s Medicaid office 80 hours of specific types of either “community engagement activities” 
or employment per month; failure to do so results in forfeiture of Medicaid benefits until such 
time the state allows the individual to re-apply to the program. The reasoning often cited to 
justify federal support for and state implementation of such programs is that work requirements 
encourage labor force participation and, therefore, economic growth. Supporters also state that 
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government provision of healthcare can be warranted or further supported when the contributions 
of an increasing number of Medicaid-eligible Americans, who are able to work, volunteer, or 
further their education begin doing so at an adequate rate (Sanger-Katz, 2018).   
Others argue that these work requirements (and other methods in which the federal 
government has delegated power to the states regarding Medicaid) are enacted in lieu of failed 
efforts to repeal or stop the Medicaid expansion program provided to states through the ACA 
(Solomon, 2018). Still one more argument for these policies is that some of the able-bodied 
persons who are “taking advantage” of government insurance will go back to the private 
insurance market in the face of work requirements and the related administrative burden that 
must be overcome to complete them. The beneficiaries in this scenario may not want or be able 
to fully complete these administrative obstacles (Solomon, 2018). 
Section 1115 of the Social Security Act allows for “demonstration projects” in which 
new and experimental policies can be proposed by states. In order to gain approval from the 
federal government, these policies must meet certain requirements, and must, according to 
Section 1115 guidelines, be “likely to assist in promoting the objectives of [Medicaid]” and 
“show that a proposed demonstration project will increase and strengthen coverage, increase 
health care access, improve health outcomes, or increase the efficiency and quality of care for 
Medicaid beneficiaries and other low-income populations” (Solomon, 2018). Before the Trump 
Administration took office, none of the states hoping to implement their own demonstration 
projects through Medicaid expansion could meet the requirement of proof necessary—that their 
project would increase or strengthen coverage, health outcomes, efficiency, or quality of care 
(Solomon, 2018). These proposals were then not approved by the Obama Administration, on the 
grounds that HHS found these policies “would have the effect of reducing enrollment” and “that 
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these policies did not advance Medicaid’s objectives” (Greenwald and Solomon, 2018). In Utah, 
Indiana, Kentucky, Maine, Wisconsin, Arkansas, and New Hampshire, the proposals delineated 
that “Medicaid eligibility” would be based on “work and work-related activities” and in Utah, 
Maine, and Wisconsin, time limits were even imposed on how long people could be enrolled in 
Medicaid (Solomon, 2018).  
Under the Trump Administration however, CMS created new policy guidance and 
objectives, making different connections to the usefulness of work requirements and presenting 
new rationales for why they work. Administrative burden, a concept concisely defined by 
Moynihan, Herd, and Harvey as “an individual’s experience of policy implementation as 
onerous” plays a further role in the rationale behind these work requirements, as well as provides 
a framework for classifying certain aspects of these work requirements and will be used as such 
in this paper. 
Many of the aforementioned states’ proposals were, at least initially, approved through 
these new administrative policies under CMS once the Trump Administration took office. Two 
of these states that received approval, Kentucky and Arkansas, are studied herein. The primary 
research question is: What effect did the administrative burden of Arkansas’s work and 
community engagement requirement program have on Medicaid enrollment and dropout rates, 
and how can this estimate the results of Kentucky’s Medicaid waiver and its own work 
requirements?  
 
Literature Review and Hypothesis 
 Under the Trump Administration, states were invited to change Medicaid eligibility 
requirements and add work requirements (Englehard, 2018). Kentucky was the first state to alter 
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its Medicaid waivers in this manner and receive this approval. Arkansas, which received 
approval shortly after Kentucky, was the first state to implement them because Kentucky’s work 
requirements were challenged in court. Currently, almost half of all states are either considering 
or actively pursuing approval for work requirements in Medicaid (Englehard, 2018). 
 The rationale that CMS uses to support the legality of work requirements in expansion 
proposals is, in summary, that there is a connection of employment to the aforementioned 
outcomes, and that these programs have increased overall employment, participation in job 
training, and general increase in earned income for those that leave the Medicaid program for 
“commercial coverage and self-sufficiency,” thereby decreasing reliance on the government’s 
public programs (MACPAC, 2018b). Further, in Section 1115 of the regulations for similar, 
future state expansion endeavors, CMS states that these requirements “promote upward mobility, 
greater independence, and improved quality of life among individuals” (MACPAC, 2018b). 
Those that oppose these proposals are concerned about the “potential harms to beneficiaries,” 
and bring up the fact that many Medicaid beneficiaries are already working (MACPAC, 2018b). 
 These waiver programs are closely linked to the agenda of the Trump Administration. In 
March 2017, Human Services Secretary Tom Price and CMS administrator Seema Verma sent a 
letter to the governors of the United States informing them of the Trump Administration’s views 
regarding the Affordable Care Act’s Medicaid expansion proposal, calling it “a clear departure 
from the core, historical mission of the program” and stating that the rigid nature of the Medicaid 
expansion rules under the ACA, prior to the Trump Administration and its own vision for 
allowing states more freedom and options to expand, “provided states with an incentive to 
deprioritize the most vulnerable populations” (Price and Verma, 2017). This precedes the 
perceived purpose of the letter, which was to announce their support for methods such as work 
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requirements, stating “It is our intent to use existing Section 1115 demonstration authority to 
review and approve meritorious innovations that build on the human dignity that comes with 
training, employment and independence” (Price and Verma, 2017). 
 In addition, in a speech to the National Association of Medicaid Directors (NAMD) 2017 
Fall Conference, Administrator Verma again mentioned work requirements, emphasizing the 
Administration’s inclusion of them as a cornerstone of their Medicaid policy. She said, in part,  
“For people living with disabilities, CMS has long believed that meaningful work is essential to 
their economic self-sufficiency, self-esteem, wellbeing and improving their health. Why would 
we not believe that the same is true for working age, able-bodied Medicaid enrollees? Believing 
that community engagement requirements do not support or promote the objectives of Medicaid 
is a tragic example of the soft bigotry of low expectations consistently espoused by the prior 
administration. Those days are over” (Verma, 2017). This is a clear explanation of policy and 
demonstrates the Trump Administration’s reasoning for the support of work requirements for 
Medicaid. 
CMS has approved the waivers requested by (among others) Arizona, Arkansas, Indiana, 
Kentucky, Michigan, New Hampshire, and Wisconsin. Their waivers share certain similarities. 
For example, their waivers all “require certain non-disabled, non-elderly, non-pregnant 
individuals to meet work and community engagement requirements as a condition of Medicaid 
eligibility” (MACPAC, 2018b). Though they share this adopted policy, the states differ in their 
implementation of it by setting different standards for the work requirements. These differences 
are found in the groups that are required to participate in these work programs to be eligible for 
Medicaid and which individuals within those groups are exempt, in the activities that fulfill the 
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work requirements, the required number of hours that must be completed, and in the severity of 
the penalties associated with not complying with the requirements (MACPAC, 2018b). 
 To allow for this flexibility in program administration, CMS provided few guidelines, 
most of which are quite vague. For example, one guideline is that “states must automatically 
consider individuals in compliance with Medicaid requirements if they are satisfying TANF or 
SNAP work requirements” as well as the encouragement of “states to consider allowing a range 
of activities to qualify as community engagement, including career planning, volunteering, and 
participating in tribal employment programs” (MACPAC, 2018b). 
Arkansas received approval from the federal government and began implementation of its 
work requirement waiver in June 2018 (Wilson and Thompson, 2018). Monthly enrollment and 
other data have been collected since June by the Arkansas Department of Human Services 
(Arkansas Department of Human Services, 2019). A preliminary analysis by the Kaiser Family 
Foundation found, in part, that a “total of 18,164 individuals have lost coverage since September 
2018, due to failing to meet the work and reporting requirements” and also, “78% of those not 
exempt (4,776 out of 6,087) did not report 80 hours of qualifying work activities” (Rudowitz et 
al., 2019). All data are publicly available; however, Arkansas is the only state of the three with 
recorded, actual data at this time. Indiana and New Hampshire have only provided projected 
outcomes data. 
Kentucky’s work requirement waiver, entitled “Kentucky Helping to Engage and 
Achieve Long Term Health” or KY-HEALTH, as previously noted, received approval from the 
Trump Administration, a decision that was later struck down by a federal court decision in 
Stewart v. Azar. The main argument in Stewart v. Azar was that the approval of the waiver 
seemed arbitrary and in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and did not take 
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into account its impact on the health coverage of those eligible for Medicaid (Musumeci, 2018). 
After minor edits were made to the waiver, the administration approved it a second time (Yetter, 
2019). This most recent version of the waiver is used for the analysis in this paper. Also, as noted 
in the introduction, it has been challenged again in court, and a decision was handed down on 
March 27, 2019 in Charles Gresham, et al v. Alex M. Azar et al. In the ruling, the same Judge 
Boasberg once again blocked Kentucky’s work requirements as well as Arkansas’s. He first 
examined Arkansas’s original approval by HHS Secretary Azar and found it to be “arbitrary and 
capricious” and that Azar failed to “consider adequately” the impact, in the same manner as 
Kentucky when he blocked their requirements the first time (Goodnough, 2019). Then, once 
again, Kentucky’s work requirements were blocked based on Judge Boasberg’s view that the 
changes were so minimal that the new plan “has essentially the same features as it did before” 
and that HHS did not consider to the fullest extent “the coverage-loss consequences” 
(Goodnough, 2019).  
The concept of administrative burden, as briefly noted above, is further explained by 
Moynihan, Herd, and Harvey as what shapes citizens’ experience of the interactions they have 
with their government, including whether they can successfully access services provided to them 
by the government as well as be treated fairly and respectfully (Moynihan et. al, 2015). Further, 
it “alters the unit of analysis in citizen-state interactions” and the degree of severity of such 
burdens corresponds to how much this unit of analysis in these interactions is altered (Moynihan 
et. al, 2015). This directly affects the subject matter of state-imposed Medicaid work 
requirements as well as many other government services and their provision.  
Lavertu, Lewis, and Moynihan also discussed the concept and theory of administrative 
burden in government, particularly how it was coupled with the administration of George W. 
 
 
 
13 
Bush’s Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART) (Lavertu et al., 2013). Although the subjects 
were government employees instead of the Medicaid population, they were the ones affected by 
the government administrative burden in this scenario, in having to follow the new government 
requirements to assess their own programs in whatever ways the Office of Management and 
Budget, that managed the Bush Administration’s PART system, asked of them. Further, Lavertu, 
Lewis, and Moynihan found that the managers surveyed in “agencies associated with liberal 
programs and employees (“liberal agencies”) agreed to a greater extent than those in agencies 
associated with conservative programs and employees (“conservative agencies”) that PART 
required significant agency time and effort and that it imposed a burden on management 
resources” (Lavertu et al., 2013). They focused on “Clinton and Lewis’s measure of agency 
ideology” in order to define which agencies were “liberal” versus those that were “conservative,” 
which essentially was based on survey data collected by those in academia, think tanks, and 
media outlets that deal with the federal government. They also combined this with “the 
percentage of agency career managers that self-identified as Democrats (including independents 
who lean Democratic); the average respondent ideology (reported on a seven-point scale from 
“very conservative” to “very liberal”); and the average respondent ideal point based on how 
respondents themselves would have voted on bills in Congress” (Lavertu et al., 2013). 
It is also important to note that Lavertu et al. found objective differences between federal 
agencies when it came to quantity and severity of burdens that PART imposed. They found that 
“liberal agencies were required to evaluate more programs and implement more improvement 
plans relative to their organizational capacity” (Lavertu et al., 2013). This further supports the 
idea of political motivation behind the costs imposed as administrative burden at many junctures 
within the government. 
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 Heinrich (2018) studied the effect of immigration policy in the United States, and how 
administrative burden occurs, in part, in the form of the unclear law resulting from 
“compromises and tradeoffs” at the federal level that leave a large part of implementation and 
enforcement of these laws and policies up to state and local governments’ discretion. 
Specifically, she studied a policy in Texas that denied some children born to Mexican 
immigrants, who were citizens, access to their birth certificates, and interviewed parents and 
analyzed survey data of children affected by this policy (Heinrich, 2018). The purpose of this 
was to show what outcomes from her study could also apply to other policies related to 
immigration that hinder immigrants’ access to government assistance and benefits and ultimately 
“impose barriers to their integration into society” through this administrative burden (Heinrich, 
2018). She found “serious, adverse consequences” for these children, reiterating that this was 
largely due to the administrative burden imposed in the enforcement and the lack of transparency 
and fairness of the laws at the state and local levels (Heinrich, 2018). She concludes by calling 
on those in the fields of public administration and political science to further study administrative 
burden, and points out that her findings are just one example of how discretion during the 
implementation process “can diminish the transparent and effective execution” of such policies, 
“as well as our commitment to equality of opportunity under the law” (Heinrich, 2018). 
Finally, Moynihan, Herd, and Ribgy, in their 2013 analysis of the administrative burden 
of Medicaid procedures in all 50 states, present the most comprehensive model, providing a 
useful context for this analysis. They studied several aspects of each of the Medicaid applications 
and procedures for all states, and found that in states with Medicaid applications that had fewer 
questions, required lower expense reporting burden, and did not require an interview, the rates of 
take-up for Medicaid were higher (Moynihan et al., 2013). In addition, they concluded by 
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revealing a political aspect of administrative burden: in states where Democrats were in power, 
applicants were less likely to face a high administrative burden (Moynihan et al., 2013). The 
authors conclude by stressing the importance of future studies of administrative burden using the 
type of measures they used. They note that studies largely examine legislation but rarely 
administrative rules that are also a form of policy, and often, burden (Moynihan et al., 2013). 
Therefore, regarding the many current Medicaid recipients and their struggle with 
maintaining benefits when work or community engagement requirements are put in place, these 
programs are likely to impose an administrative burden on these recipients. Moynihan, Herd, and 
Harvey add to the theory of administrative burden by delineating three distinct types: learning 
costs, psychological costs, and compliance costs (Moynihan et al., 2015). Learning costs “arise 
from engaging in search processes to collect information about public services, and assessing 
how they are relevant to the individual” (Moynihan et al., 2015). Psychological costs “include 
the stigma of applying for or participating in a program with negative perceptions, a sense of loss 
of power or autonomy in interactions with the state, or the stresses of dealing with administrative 
processes” (Moynihan et al., 2015). Compliance costs “are the burdens of following 
administrative rules and requirements” which could be “costs of completing forms, or providing 
documentation of status” or in the business world, the many costs associated with compliance 
with government regulations (Moynihan et al., 2015). This is the main theoretical lens through 
which I conduct my research, and that I use for my classification and comparison of the work 
requirements in both Arkansas and Kentucky. 
This literature leads to the aim of this paper, which will be to examine the effects of 
Medicaid work requirement implementation and its associated administrative burdens on 
enrollment in Arkansas’s federally approved expansion program. In a second step, I will be able 
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to estimate the impact the administration of work requirements in Kentucky would have, for all 
aspects of the program this state shares with Arkansas. Arkansas was chosen because it was the 
first state to implement these work requirements and at present the only state with data after 
implementation available to the public. Based on the literature reviewed, my hypothesis is that 
with a greater administrative burden, more eligible people will forgo a benefit, and, more 
specifically, in this case, more people that are eligible for Medicaid will forgo Medicaid due to 
the administrative burdens associated with work requirements. Arkansas’s trend is expected to be 
similar in Kentucky once it implements its own work requirements, especially if the two states 
have a similar amount and level of severity of these burdens within the proposals for their work 
requirements in each of their waivers. 
 
Research Design 
 To begin, it is important to contextualize both Arkansas and Kentucky and the similarities 
that led them to impose these work requirements in the first place. Therefore, I briefly address 
any similarities between the two states’ governments’ structure and the political parties in power 
in the governorship, house, and senate at the time that they submitted these waivers. This will 
give initial insight to and lay important groundwork for the rest of the research of this paper.  
This information will also help strengthen the internal validity of the study, as comparing 
two different states on an issue such as this can prove to be problematic if the proper factors are 
not taken into consideration and controlled for. The similarities between the two work 
requirement waivers in Arkansas and Kentucky are the basis of this analysis, but to examine 
whether there was a decrease in enrollment in Arkansas that can be attributed to the work 
requirements, I will use West Virginia as the control case for Arkansas.  The two states are 
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regionally close, and upon initial viewing of the enrollment trend, West Virginia follows a 
broadly similar trajectory as pre-treatment Arkansas. West Virginia has not pursued work 
requirements at this time. 
 Total enrollment data for Arkansas, Kentucky, and West Virginia can be found via 
Medicaid.gov, and specifically, the page entitled “Monthly Medicaid & CHIP Application, 
Eligibility Determination, and Enrollment Reports & Data” (Medicaid.gov, 2019). This raw data 
can be downloaded and is available for public use. This data will be used to show the trends of 
Arkansas, Kentucky, and West Virginia’s total Medicaid enrollment for the months before and 
after June 2018, or, the month in which Arkansas began implementation of their work 
requirements.  
 I will estimate the effect of this policy change by looking at the difference between the 
change in enrollment in Arkansas and the change in enrollment in West Virginia, over the same 
time period (encompassing the policy change in Arkansas, but not West Virginia). I will then use 
the difference of change in enrollment for both of these states as an estimate of the effect of the 
work requirements on Arkansas’s Medicaid enrollment, net of other trends. This estimate will in 
turn serve to estimate enrollment changes in Kentucky if the work requirements are approved. 
Figure 1 shows each state’s Medicaid enrollment over time, and Figure 2 shows enrollment as a 
percentage of each state’s population, to allow for comparability.  
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Figure 1: Total Medicaid Enrollment in Arkansas, Kentucky, and West Virginia 
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Figure 2: Percent of Medicaid Enrollees in Each State Based on Yearly Population in 
Arkansas, Kentucky, and West Virginia 
 
 
The changes in the trend lines in Figure 2 look more dramatic than those of Figure 1, and 
this is due to the changes in population.1 Also, it is important to note that each month out of the 
year uses the same population, the census annual estimate. Therefore, there is a change in 
population only from December 2017 to January 2018, in which Arkansas’s estimate increased 
by 10,828 and West Virginia’s estimate actually decreased by 11,216.  
                                                
1 In this same vein, it could also be important to compare the slopes of these trends. The slope (or the average 
month-to-month change) of the pre-treatment trend for Arkansas is (-0.020)/17 months = -0.001, or -0.1%. The 
slope of the post-treatment trend for Arkansas is (-0.019)/7 months = -0.003, or -0.3%. The slope of the pre-
treatment trend for West Virginia is 0.010/17 months = -0.0006, or -0.06%. The slope of the post-treatment trend for 
West Virginia is (-0.006)/7 = -0.0008, or -0.08%.  
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 Moynihan, Herd, and Ribgy created their own method to code the administrative burden 
of Medicaid procedures in all 50 states, which included looking at the application for Medicaid, 
and also the enrollment process overall in 2013. These coding categories included: length of 
application (“How long (measured in number of words) is the state Medicaid application?”), 
number of questions on the application, the income reporting burden (“Do individuals have to 
report income sources in the application process? Do they have to document income sources? 
How many different types of income have to be specified?”), the expense reporting burden (“Do 
individuals have to report expenses in the application process? Do they have to document 
expenses? How many different types of expenses have to be specified?”), whether or not 
individuals have to provide documentation proving their residency in the state, whether or not 
the enrollment process requires “an in-person interview to qualify for the program,” and whether 
or not an applicant has “to renew their status every 6 months as opposed to every year” 
(Moynihan et al., 2013). They then compared this (now quantitative) data on the burden scores 
using a series of OLS regressions “on measures of state economic/fiscal and political context” 
(Moynihan et al., 2013). 
 This analysis draws on some of the same concepts used by Moynihan, Herd, and Rigby 
for coding the administrative burden imposed on Medicaid recipients in Arkansas and Kentucky. 
I will analyze both waivers and sort data into the following categories: age requirement, hour 
requirement for work or community service activities in order to remain eligible for Medicaid 
benefits, the standard(s) for being above and below the federal poverty line and still receiving 
Medicaid benefits, the reporting methods allowed or provided, reasons for disenrollment, the 
types of activities that are allowed to complete the requirement, the ways in which people are 
allowed to reapply after loss of eligibility (if any), premium or copayment or cost-sharing 
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specifications and requirements, whether or not the state will still provide non-emergency 
medical transportation, and all of the exemptions for these aforementioned requirements or 
burdens. This can be found in more detail in the Analysis and Findings section. 
 These are compared side by side and each state’s requirements are included in the 
analysis for comparison. I hypothesize that enough of these categories of administrative burden 
are similar enough to show that Kentucky’s total enrollment will follow a similar trajectory in 
Medicaid enrollment as Arkansas over time. Therefore, monthly Medicaid enrollment in each 
state is the primary unit of analysis in this paper. The data are then analyzed to see if there is an 
overall shift leading to a decrease, using a difference-in-differences estimator.  
Following this analysis, the goal is to be able to provide data that could give a sense of 
the future effect that work and community engagement requirements could have on the state of 
Kentucky once they are implemented, and whether it will follow a similar trend.  
 
Background 
 The structures of the state governments of Arkansas and Kentucky are quite similar, 
especially in recent years. In both states, the Republican party has control of the governorship as 
well as both houses of the state legislature, or what is commonly called a “trifecta.” Arkansas’s 
current Republican governor, Asa Hutchinson, has been governor since he was elected in 2015 
and was preceded by a Democrat, Mike Beebe. A Republican majority has controlled both the 
Arkansas House of Representatives and state Senate since 2012, and the number of Republican 
representatives has grown after each election since 2012 as well. In Kentucky, Republican 
Governor Matt Bevin has been governor since 2015. He was preceded by Steve Beshear, a 
Democrat. A Republican majority has controlled the state Senate since 2014, but the House of 
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Representatives has only had a Republican majority since 2016. That is to say, Kentucky’s 
“trifecta” has only been in effect since 2016. A Republican trifecta also currently exists in West 
Virginia; however, this has not been the case for long. The current governor, Jim Justice, was 
elected and assumed office as a Democrat, but shortly after announced that he was switching to 
the Republican Party, and now holds office as a Republican governor. The West Virginia 
legislature consists of the West Virginia House of Delegates and the West Virginia Senate. Both 
the house and senate have been under Republican control since 2014. 
 
Analysis and Findings 
 I began my data collection by finding both states’ CMS-approved Section 1115 waivers 
and reading through each of them. As I read through them, any requirement or exemption listed 
was copied and pasted into a document of my own in order to keep track of all of them. Each 
requirement and exemption was then compared side by side to its counterpart in the other state 
and those that were similar, or exactly the same, were identified as such. Then, those that clearly 
would impose some sort of burden; psychological costs, compliance costs, or learning costs on 
Medicaid recipients were selected and eventually included in the table viewable in the Appendix. 
This table includes the relevant work requirements and exemptions coded directly from both 
Arkansas and Kentucky’s 1115 waivers. This analysis did draw on the coding categories for 
administrative burden by Moynihan, Herd, and Ribgy (2013), and additional categories: 
Exemptions (for Work Requirements in General), General Reporting Requirements, and 
Requirement of Hours to Remain Eligible. 
I also included in the table my own 1-5 scoring scale, 1 being least severe and 5 being the 
most, as to what I considered to be the severity of burden for each requirement and exemption in 
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both Arkansas and Kentucky’s 1115 waivers explaining their work requirement plans. I included 
the exemptions to these rules that each state listed as well, in order to give a fuller picture of the 
burden that is or will be imposed on citizens. It is important to note that I rated exemptions that 
seemed less stringent (in other words, that they exempt more people and more groups) 
consistently lower on the same scoring scale because I view a higher amount of people exempted 
as a lower burden on the state’s Medicaid eligible population as a whole. Below is a simplified 
version of overall scores. A more detailed version of this table in the Appendix, and includes the 
scores for each category, total scores, and total possible score for each of the states’ waivers.  
Requirement/Exemptions Kentucky 
HEALTH 
Score 
Arkansas 
Works 
Score 
Age Requirement 3 3 
Federal Poverty Line (FPL) Standard 4 4 
Exemptions (for Work Requirements in General) 3 2 
General Reporting Requirements 2 4 
Requirement of Hours to Remain Eligible 4 4 
Types of Allowed Activities to Complete Requirement 3 2 
How to Retry/Reenter/ Reapply After Loss of Eligibility 2 5 
Premium/Copayment 4 4 
Premium/copayment exemptions 3 2 
Waiver of the Requirement to Provide Non-Emergency Medical 
Transportation (NEMT) 
 
3 
 
1 
Reasons for Disenrollment 4 2 
Retroactive Eligibility 2 3 
TOTAL SCORES: 37 36 
TOTAL POSSIBLE POINTS: 60 60 
 
Kentucky’s administrative burden, according to my scoring mechanism, scored an almost 
negligible one point higher than Arkansas, and therefore I think we can expect similar results in a 
likely drop in enrollment as the Arkansas decrease and therefore, the estimate for Kentucky 
should be quite similar to the one done in this analysis. This one point is a difference and will be 
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taken into account in my analysis, but it is not practically significant, as Arkansas’s score is 
97.3% of Kentucky’s, and could be the result of error when assigning scores based on the 
severity of the requirements and the amount of burden they imply. These categories of 
administrative burden are similar between the two states and show that Kentucky’s total 
enrollment will likely follow a similar trajectory as Arkansas’s in Medicaid enrollment over 
time. Arkansas can then be used as a basis for making a projection for Kentucky. It is important 
to note that it is possible that some burdens are more important than others, and this could affect 
the analysis. If the difference is greater in one of the more “important” categories, or in other 
words, a category that is more likely than others to lead a Medicaid recipient to lose or withdraw 
from coverage, this could mean that there is a larger difference overall between the two states’ 
Medicaid work requirements, and therefore a study in which the two states’ enrollment would be 
less comparable when explaining a trend in Medicaid enrollment.  
Scoring is in relation to the other state’s requirements. For example, in the “Reasons for 
Disenrollment” category, Kentucky’s waiver listed the following: Failure to make required 
premium contributions within sixty (60) days of the date of invoice, failure to provide the 
necessary information for the state to complete an annual redetermination, and failure to timely 
and accurately report a change in circumstance affecting eligibility only in such circumstances 
where a beneficiary would no longer be eligible for Medicaid. Arkansas listed the following: 
Determined to be medically frail after they were previously determined eligible and failure to 
report compliance for 3 months (state will dis-enroll the beneficiary for the remainder of the 
calendar year). I rated Kentucky a 4 and Arkansas a 2 on this category for three reasons. First, 
Kentucky offers less of a grace period for their premiums that Arkansas offers for their 
compliance reporting (60 versus 90 days). Also, the vague language presents a burden in and of 
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itself; “timely and accurately” should definitely be more specific – especially since it is regarding 
reasons for total disenrollment from the program and benefits. Finally, Arkansas includes 
“determined to be medically frail” after already determined eligible, whereas Kentucky chooses 
to use the phrasing “change in circumstance affecting eligibility only in such circumstances 
where a beneficiary would no longer be eligible for Medicaid.” This encompasses medical frailty 
– and many other possible changes. Therefore, Kentucky’s administrative burden is deemed to 
be this much higher than Arkansas’s regarding this category.  
An example of coding exemptions rather than requirements is in the category 
“Premium/copayment exemptions.” 
 Kentucky included the following groups as exempt:  
• Pregnant women 
• Survivors of domestic violence 
• Former foster care youth 
• Beneficiaries who are eligible for transitional medical assistance as described in sections 
1925 and 193 I (cX2) of the Act 
• Those determined medically frail 
 
Arkansas, on the other hand, included the following:  
• Individuals ages 1 and older and under age 18 and infants under age 1 whose income is 
under 150 percent FPL (for premiums) or 133 percent FPL (for cost sharing) 
• Children for whom child welfare services are made available under Part B of title IV of 
the Act on the basis of being a child in foster care and individuals receiving benefits 
under Part E of that title, without regard to age 
• At state option, individuals under age 19, 20 or age 21, eligible under § 435.222 of this 
chapter 
• Disabled children, except as provided at § 447.55(a)(4) (premiums), who are receiving 
medical assistance by virtue of the application of the Family Opportunity Act in 
accordance with sections 1902(a)(10)(A)(ii)(XIX) and 1902(cc) of the Act 
• Pregnant women, except for premiums allowed under § 447.55(a)(1) and cost sharing 
for services specified in the state plan as not pregnancy-related, during the pregnancy 
and through the postpartum period which begins on the last day of pregnancy and 
extends through the end of the month in which the 60-day period following termination 
of pregnancy ends 
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• Any individual whose medical assistance for services furnished in an institution, or at 
state option in a home and community-based setting, is reduced by amounts reflecting 
available income other than required for personal needs 
• An individual receiving hospice care, as defined in section 1905(o) of the Act 
• An Indian who is eligible to receive or has received an item or service furnished by an 
Indian health care provider or through referral under contract health services is exempt 
from premiums. Indians who are currently receiving or have ever received an item or 
service furnished by an Indian health care provider or through referral under contract 
health services are exempt from all cost sharing 
• Individuals who are receiving Medicaid because of the state's election to extend 
coverage as authorized by § 435.213 of this chapter (Breast and Cervical Cancer). 
 
While there are a larger number of groups in Arkansas, I viewed many of these groups as being 
accounted for in Kentucky as well in more general terms. However, there were also several that 
were not, so it was largely due to the fact that Arkansas exempts more groups that I rated 
Kentucky a 3 and Arkansas a 2. The number is lower here, again, because more exemptions 
surely mean a lower burden as more people do not have to provide work or community 
engagement hours in order to receive Medicaid. This method may not work as well in a future 
study if it were to compare all fifty states, and would probably benefit from using more objective 
methodology such as Moynihan et al.’s, described previously. 
I collected, cleaned, and sorted total enrollment data for Arkansas, Kentucky, and West 
Virginia, found via Medicaid.gov, “Monthly Medicaid & CHIP Application, Eligibility 
Determination, and Enrollment Reports & Data” (Medicaid.gov). To determine the previous 
trend of enrollment before June 2018 (to reiterate – the month of the beginning of 
implementation of Arkansas’s work requirements), I collected data for Arkansas, Kentucky, and 
West Virginia starting in January 2017. The analysis starts here, and not earlier, for two reasons: 
enrollment is not on a consistent trend before 2017, and in January 2017 the Trump 
Administration took office, which changed the political environment. This data ends in 
December 2018, as this is the most recent month that data could be found for all three states.  
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 Using this monthly enrollment data, I standardized by calculating the change in 
enrollment from month to month in all three states. Using this data, I estimated the difference-in-
differences of the percent of those enrolled divided by the state’s annual population between 
West Virginia, my control state, and Arkansas, my treatment state. Below are my findings: 
 
Table 1: Difference-in-Differences Estimation of Percentage of Medicaid Enrollment Per 
State Annual Population 
 
 
Average Pre-
June 2018 
Medicaid 
Enrollment 
 
 
Standard 
Error 
 
Average Post-
June 2018 
Medicaid 
Enrollment 
 
 
Standard 
Error 
 
Difference 
between Pre- 
and Post-June 
2018 Average 
Enrollment 
 
 
 
Standard 
Error 
Arkansas 30.21% 0.12% 
 
28.85% 
 
 
0.25% 
 
 
-1.36% 
 
 
0.26% 
West Virginia 
 
30.67% 
 
0.09% 
 
29.85% 
 
0.12% -0.81% 
 
0.16% 
Difference 
between 
Arkansas and 
West Virginia 
0.45% 
 
0.15% 
 
1.00% 
 
0.27% 
 
-0.54% 
 
 
0.30% 
 
In Table 1, 30.21%, 28.85%, 30.67%, and 29.85% represent the proportions of average Medicaid 
populations over the respective months for their respective states. In other words, each of these is 
the average of each month’s total Medicaid enrollment divided by the total population for that 
year. -1.36% is the difference in enrollment between the average pre- and post-June 2018 
Medicaid enrollment in Arkansas, meaning that there is a decrease of 1.36 percent on average of 
total Medicaid enrollment in Arkansas between the two periods. -0.81% is the difference in 
enrollment between the average pre- and post-June 2018 change in Medicaid enrollment in West 
Virginia, meaning that there is a decrease of 0.81 percent on average of total Medicaid 
enrollment in West Virginia between the two periods. The difference between Arkansas and 
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West Virginia shows that there is a slightly larger decrease on average in Arkansas in relation to 
West Virginia: about 0.54 percent. 
 The decrease in total enrollment between the pre-treatment period (12 months of 2017 
and 6 months of 2018, so 2/3 of the time is in 2017 and 1/3 in 2018) and post-treatment period (6 
months of 2018) can be calculated by multiplying 30.21% by 2/3 of 3,002,997 times 1/3 of 
3,013,825, and subtract from this figure 28.85% multiplied by 3,013,825.2 The value of this 
calculation is 41,931. This is the gross drop in enrollment, and to find the percentage of this that 
was due to work requirements, 54 (from 0.54 percent) divided by 136 (from -1.36 percent), or 
0.397. Just under 40% lost enrollment due to the work requirements according to this analysis, or 
16,649 people. This can be visualized using Figure 2.  
This estimation is different than the actual drop in enrollment according to the percentage 
change in population, which is a decrease of 49,937, as opposed to the estimation of 41,931. This 
figure multiplied that same percentage, 0.397, is 19,828 as opposed to the estimation of 16,649. 
This many people were disenrolled due to work requirements. The difference between these two 
numbers shows that there is some distortion introduced by my analysis, but I had to standardize 
to compare two states with different population sizes. This can be visualized in Figure 1. 
West Virginia did not have a treatment (implementation of a Medicaid work requirement 
program) during the entire period of study and Arkansas did, during the months studied of June 
2018 to December 2018. Therefore, this first step of this analysis shows that while Arkansas has 
more of a decrease post treatment in Medicaid enrollment than West Virginia, it is likely due to 
other factors. It is also important to acknowledge that the key assumption of parallel trends is not 
                                                
2 The equation described above is: 0.3021 * (((2/3) * 3,002,997) + ((1/3) * 3,013,825))) - ((0.2885) * 3,013,825 
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truly accurate for the pre-treatment time period, or, in other words, these trends are not truly 
parallel.  
Having estimated the decrease in enrollment as a result of work requirements net of 
existing trends in Arkansas, I am now applying this to Kentucky’s enrollment numbers in order 
to estimate how many fewer people will be disenrolled if and when Kentucky implements their 
work requirements.  
In Table 2 below, 27.54% is the average percentage of those enrolled in Medicaid per the 
total annual population in Kentucky from July 2018 to December 2018, or the same time period 
as the entire post-treatment period for Arkansas. It is important to note again that Kentucky has 
not implemented its work requirements yet, and therefore did not during this time. 27% 
represents the estimated percentage of those enrolled in Medicaid per the total annual population 
in Kentucky if work requirements were to be implemented. 
 In other words, this shows that if Kentucky ever implements work requirements, the 
change due to work requirements alone will only be about a 0.54 of a percent decrease, the same 
as the estimated effect in Arkansas. Multiplying 27.54% by the estimated population in 2018 in 
Kentucky, 4,468,402, and then subtracting 0.54% from 27.54%, multiplying this by the 
population, and subtracting the first number from the second, the number of enrollees that would 
be disenrolled during this period in Kentucky due to the administrative burden of work 
requirements is about 24,129 people, over and above the existing trend.3 
This estimation of Kentucky with work requirements is based on the difference-in-
differences estimation between Arkansas and West Virginia subtracted from the change in 
                                                
3 The equation described above is (0.275 * 4,468,402) - ((0.275-0.0054) * 4,468,402) 
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average Medicaid enrollment of the total annual population in Kentucky from June 2018 to 
December 2018. 
 
Table 2: Estimation of Percentage of Medicaid Enrollees for Kentucky Based on June 2018 
to December 2018 Data 
Estimation of Kentucky With 
Work Requirements (Post-
Implementation) 
 
27.00% 
 
 
1,206,469 
 
Kentucky With No Work 
Requirements 
 
 
27.54% 
 
1,230,598 
 
Difference -0.54% -24,129 
 
 These findings are congruent to an extent with other similar studies that have already 
been done on enrollment declines in Arkansas. For example, an NPR report in February 
indicated that of the 62,000 recipients subject to the work requirements upon implementation, 
18,000 had been disenrolled by December 2018 (Froelich, 2019). My estimate in Arkansas is 
about 16,245 disenrolled due to work requirements by December 2018. The NPR study did not 
use West Virginia as a control state so that could be one reason our numbers do not entirely 
agree. However, both my analysis and the NPR study agree to an extent that Medicaid 
enrollment has been declining in Arkansas, and the findings of my study stop short at being able 
to confidently say that the work requirements are responsible for this decline in enrollment.  
 
Limitations 
Limitations to this analysis include, first and foremost, the fact that, in studying West 
Virginia and Arkansas, I was analyzing two states that were already decreasing in enrollment 
before the work requirements in Arkansas even came into being. The ideal study would have a 
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flat, or even increasing, and more importantly, parallel, trend between the two states before the 
treatment in order to truly assess work requirements as the causal factor in this decrease in 
enrollment. However, in this study there is no way to tell for certain how much of that decrease 
is due to the administrative burden of work requirements. 
Another limitation is external validity. The focus on the similar aspects of the two 
waivers will at least provide some external validity for applicability not only to Kentucky, but 
other similar states that receive approval for implementation of work requirements, but there are 
still many reasons why this analysis would not translate externally to other states if more 
Medicaid work requirements go forward and are implemented. Also, West Virginia is an 
imperfect control state but the use of a control state was important to the internal validity of this 
analysis. Internal validity also is a concern, however, because the demographic makeup is not 
taken into account for either state, including things like the age, race, and sex of the Medicaid 
enrollees studied. Hopefully, this research on recent occurrences and data will push forward 
healthcare policy research in this field, and provide an objective analysis of what happens when 
these work requirements are implemented, and considered when choosing to implement such 
policies in the future. 
In addition, the post-treatment period for Arkansas’s implementation was not as sufficient 
as I would have hoped, in order to have an analysis with more data points to show a more 
compelling picture of what the trend post-treatment would be. Future studies on this topic should 
and probably will have more post-treatment data to work with, again, if more work requirements 
for Medicaid are legally allowed to be implemented in the future. 
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Conclusion 
 In conclusion, this analysis provides an estimation of what could happen to total 
Medicaid enrollment in Kentucky and possibly other states if work and community engagement 
requirements are implemented. Using Arkansas’s trend of decreasing enrollment numbers since 
they implemented their work requirements, I found an almost negligible net effect of work 
requirements alone on Medicaid enrollment in Arkansas, and estimated and predicted the same in 
Kentucky. Future studies on this subject matter will hopefully have more data available in order 
to construct a more valid study of the actual effect of work requirements in states that have 
implemented them in comparison with those that have not and do not plan to – in order to inform 
the states that plan to what will happen to their Medicaid enrollment. Future studies that ask this 
same or a similar research question should also take into account other factors affecting 
Medicaid enrollment to provide a better basis for their estimation in order to predict their effect 
on the state(s) in question, and explain the effect of other factors leading to disenrollment. While 
this issue is politically charged, future studies should focus on analyzing the objective results of 
these programs in order to inform policy on both sides of the aisle. 
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Appendix 
 
 
Requirement/ 
Exemptions 
 
Kentucky HEALTH 
 
Score 
 
Arkansas Works 
 
Score 
 
Age 
Requirement 
 
 
Adult beneficiaries ages 19 
through 64 
 
 
3 
 
Adults beneficiaries ages 19 
through 64  
 
 
3 
 
Federal Poverty 
Line (FPL) 
Standard 
 
 
Adults up to and including 
133 percent of the FPL who 
meet the other criteria 
specified  
 
 
4 
 
Adults up to and including 
133 percent of the FPL who 
meet the criteria specified 
 
4 
 
Exemptions (for  
Work 
Requirements 
 in General) 
 
 
• Former foster care 
youth 
• Pregnant women 
• Survivors of domestic 
violence 
• Primary caregivers of a 
dependent (limited to 
one caregiver per 
household) 
• Beneficiaries considered 
medically frail 
• Beneficiaries diagnosed 
with an acute medical 
condition that would 
prevent them from 
complying with the 
requirements 
• Full time students 
 
 
3 
 
• Beneficiaries identified 
as medically frail4  
• Those who are pregnant 
or 60 days post-partum 
• Full time students  
• Beneficiary is exempt 
from Supplemental 
Nutrition Assistance 
Program (SNAP) 
community engagement 
requirements 
• Beneficiary is exempt 
from Transitional 
Employment Assistance 
(TEA) Cash Assistance 
community engagement 
requirements 
• Beneficiary receives 
TEA Cash Assistance 
• Beneficiary is 
incapacitated in the 
 
2 
                                                
4 What it means to be “medically frail” is not clearly defined in either state waiver, but I use for the working 
definition for both states the definition in Kentucky’s FAQ on their website about their work requirement waiver: 
Beneficiaries may be considered medically frail for many different reasons.  Some of those reasons include: 
Disabling mental health diagnosis, chronic substance use disorder, serious and complex medical condition, 
significant impairment in ability to perform activities of daily living, diagnosed with HIV/AIDs, eligible for Social 
Security Disability Insurance (SSDI), chronic homelessness, or a survivor of domestic violence 
https://kentuckyhealth.ky.gov/Pages/FAQ.aspx/ 
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short-term, medically 
certified as physically 
or mentally unfit for 
employment, or has an 
acute medical condition 
validated by a medical 
professional that would 
prevent him or her from 
complying with the 
requirements 
• Beneficiary is caring for 
an incapacitated person 
• Beneficiary lives in a 
home with his or her 
minor dependent child 
age 17 or younger 
• Beneficiary is receiving 
unemployment benefits  
• Beneficiary is currently 
participating in a 
treatment program for 
alcoholism or drug 
addiction 
  
 
General 
Reporting 
Requirements 
Monthly; methods allowed 
not listed 
 
2 
Monthly; allows 
beneficiaries to report 
monthly their community 
engagement qualifying 
activities or exemptions 
using ONLY an online 
portal 
 
 
4 
 
 
Requirement of 
Hours to 
Remain Eligible 
 
 
Non-exempt beneficiaries 
must complete and report 
80 hours per month  
 
 
4 
Must complete at least 80 
hours per calendar month of 
one, or any combination, of 
the qualifying activities  
 
4 
 
Types of 
Allowed 
Activities to 
Complete 
Requirement 
 
• Employment 
• Education 
• Job skills training  
• Job search activities 
• Community service 
 
 
3 
• Employment 
• Education 
• Community service 
• Self-employment, or 
having an income that is 
consistent with being 
employed or self-
employed at least 80 
hours per month 
 
2 
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• Enrollment in an 
educational program, 
including high school, 
higher education, or 
GED classes 
• Participation in on-the-
job training  
• Participation in 
vocational training  
• Participation in 
independent job search 
(up to 40 hours per 
month)  
• Participation in job 
search training (up to 40 
hours per month) 
• Participation in a class 
on health insurance 
using the health system, 
or healthy living (up to 
20 hours per year) 
• Participation in 
activities or programs 
available through the 
Arkansas Department of 
Workforce Services,  
• Participation in and 
compliance with 
SNAP/Transitional 
Employment Assistance 
(TEA) employment 
initiative programs 
 
 
How to 
Retry/Reenter/ 
Reapply After 
Loss of 
Eligibility 
 
 
Able to reactivate eligibility 
on the first day of the 
month after completing 80 
hours of community 
engagement in a 30-day 
period or a state-approved 
health literacy or financial 
literacy course […] The 
option to take a course to 
re-enter from suspension is 
available one time per 12-
month benefit period.  
 
2 
 
If the beneficiaries are 
noncompliant with the 
community engagement 
requirements or reporting 
requirements for any three 
months, eligibility will be 
terminated until the next 
plan year, when they must 
file a new application to 
receive an eligibility 
determination. At this time, 
previous noncompliance 
 
5 
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 with the community 
engagement requirement 
will not be factored into the 
state’s determination of 
their eligibility  
 
 
Premium/ 
Copayment 
Premium of not less than 
one dollar per month and 
not to exceed 4 percent of 
household income 
 
a. Individuals with income 
above 100 percent of the 
FPL who are required to 
pay premiums and who do 
not make an initial premium 
payment will not be 
enrolled in Kentucky 
HEALTH and will be 
required to reapply should 
they wish to participate.  
 
b. Individuals at or below 
100 percent of the FPL who 
are required to pay 
premiums and who do not 
make an initial premium 
payment will be enrolled in 
Kentucky HEALTH 
effective the first day of the 
month in which the sixty 
(60) day payment period 
expired; however, once 
enrolled, these beneficiaries 
will be subject to the 
requirements and conditions 
if the general requirements 
 
 
4 
Monthly premiums from 
beneficiaries with incomes 
above 100 and up to and 
including 133 percent of the 
federal poverty 
level (FPL)  
 
Beneficiaries above 100 
percent of the FPL will be 
required to pay monthly 
premiums of up to 2 percent 
of household income. 
Premiums and cost-sharing 
will be subject to an 
aggregate cap of no more 
than 5 
percent of family monthly 
or quarterly income. 
 
 
4 
 
Premium/ 
copayment 
exemptions 
• Pregnant women 
• Survivors of domestic 
violence 
• Former foster care 
youth 
• Beneficiaries who are 
eligible for transitional 
medical assistance as 
 
3 
Exemptions from cost-
sharing set forth in 42 CFR 
Section 447.56(a): 
 
• Individuals ages 1 and 
older and under age 18 
and infants under age 1 
whose income is under 
 
2 
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described in sections 
1925 and 193 I (cX2) of 
the Act 
• Those determined 
medically frail 
 
150 percent FPL (for 
premiums) or 133 
percent FPL (for cost 
sharing) 
• Children for whom 
child welfare services 
are made available 
under Part B of title IV 
of the Act on the basis 
of being a child in foster 
care and individuals 
receiving benefits under 
Part E of that title, 
without regard to age 
• At state option, 
individuals under age 
19, 20 or age 21, 
eligible under § 435.222 
of this chapter 
• Disabled children, 
except as provided at § 
447.55(a)(4) 
(premiums), who are 
receiving medical 
assistance by virtue of 
the application of the 
Family Opportunity Act 
in accordance with 
sections 
1902(a)(10)(A)(ii)(XIX) 
and 1902(cc) of the Act 
• Pregnant women, 
except for premiums 
allowed under § 
447.55(a)(1) and cost 
sharing for services 
specified in the state 
plan as not pregnancy-
related, during the 
pregnancy and through 
the postpartum period 
which begins on the last 
day of pregnancy and 
extends through the end 
of the month in which 
the 60-day period 
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following termination 
of pregnancy ends 
• Any individual whose 
medical assistance for 
services furnished in an 
institution, or at state 
option in a home and 
community-based 
setting, is reduced by 
amounts reflecting 
available income other 
than required for 
personal needs 
• An individual receiving 
hospice care, as defined 
in section 1905(o) of 
the Act 
• An Indian who is 
eligible to receive or has 
received an item or 
service furnished by an 
Indian health care 
provider or through 
referral under contract 
health services is 
exempt from premiums. 
Indians who are 
currently receiving or 
have ever received an 
item or service 
furnished by an Indian 
health care provider or 
through referral under 
contract health services 
are exempt from all cost 
sharing 
• Individuals who are 
receiving Medicaid 
because of the state's 
election to extend 
coverage as authorized 
by § 435.213 of this 
chapter (Breast and 
Cervical Cancer). 
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Waiver of the 
Requirement to 
Provide Non-
Emergency 
Medical 
Transportation 
(NEMT) 
State does waive 
this requirement as 
applicable to them. They do 
not have to provide non-
emergency medical 
transportation (NEMT) for 
beneficiaries enrolled in the 
new adult group, with 
exceptions for beneficiaries 
who are: 
 
• Medically frail 
• 19- or 20-year-old 
beneficiaries entitled to 
Early and Periodic 
Screening or 
Diagnostic, and 
Treatment (EPSDT) 
services 
• Former foster care 
youth 
• Survivors of domestic 
violence 
• Pregnant women 
 
 
 
 
3 State does not waive 
requirement – non-
emergency medical 
transport services will be 
provided through the 
State’s 
fee-for-service Medicaid 
program – and prior 
authorization will be 
established for the 
beneficiary in need of it, 
except those served by IHS 
or Tribal facilities and 
medically frail beneficiaries  
 
1 
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Reasons for 
Disenrollment 
 
 
• Failure to make required 
premium contributions 
within sixty (60) days of 
the date of invoice 
• Failure to provide the 
necessary information 
for the state to complete 
an annual 
redetermination 
• Failure to timely and 
accurately report a 
change in circumstance 
affecting eligibility only 
in such circumstances 
where a beneficiary 
would no longer be 
eligible for Medicaid  
 
4 
 
• Determined to be 
medically frail after 
they were previously 
determined eligible 
• Failure to report 
compliance for 3 
months (state will dis-
enroll the beneficiary 
for the remainder of the 
calendar year) 
 
2 
 
Retroactive 
Eligibility 
 
The state is not obligated to 
provide retroactive 
eligibility in accordance 
with Section 1902(a)(34) 
for beneficiaries enrolled in 
Kentucky HEALTH, except 
for applicants who would 
have been eligible in or 
after the third month before 
the month in which an 
application was made, as 
either pregnant women or 
former foster care youth  
 
 
2 
The state will provide 
coverage effective 30 days 
prior to the date of 
submitting an application 
for coverage for 
beneficiaries up to and 
including 133 percent 
of the FPL 
 
3 
TOTAL 
SCORES: 
 
Kentucky HEALTH 
 
37 
 
Arkansas Works 
 
36 
 
TOTAL 
POSSIBLE 
POINTS: 
 
Kentucky HEALTH 
 
60 
 
Arkansas Works 
 
60 
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